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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how EU countries can address various challenges (including the 
aging of the population) affecting their systems of old-age income support. It presents 
two scenarios illustrating the most important uncertainties surrounding the major 
developments that affect the pension systems of the EU. To diversify these risks, EU 
governments should act on several fronts. In addition to the formation of human capital 
(especially that of children), employment (especially that of older workers) should be 
boosted. This calls for social insurance reform with more emphasis on individual saving 
schemes. Pension schemes should be more explicit about how they share demographic 
and other risks. Countries that currently rely heavily on public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
schemes should stimulate private pensions by gradually reducing PAYG benefits 
collected by high-income earners, by issuing new financial instruments, and by 
conducting intergenerational risk sharing through the tax system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The systems of income support in many EU countries are under stress. Pension systems 
financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis are particularly vulnerable to the expected 
decline in the worker/retiree ratio on account of aging. Also funded schemes are 
affected by the aging trend. In particular, by reducing labor supply, aging makes capital 
less scarce compared to labor, thereby depressing asset prices and the return on capital 
(see e.g. Brooks (2000)). In addition, aging renders pension systems more vulnerable to 
risks by narrowing the contribution base compared to the outstanding pension 
obligations. Accordingly, pension rights can be protected in the face of shocks (such as 
unexpected longer longevity, inflation, or lower asset prices) only at the cost of 
substantial variations in contributions. By reducing the expected return and raising 
risks, aging thus worsens the return-risk trade-off facing pension systems. This paper 
puts the financing of old-age income support in EU countries in a broader context by 
discussing how not only aging but also other developments impact the future of old-age 
income support. These non-demographic trends include globalization, technological 
change, individualization and more heterogeneous tastes and needs. Indeed, these trends 
are likely to be as important as the aging of the population in determining the future of 
old-age income insurance.  
 
This paper focuses on the systems of income support in old age rather than on health 
care, housing, and social care services provided to the elderly. It analyses EU pension 
systems in a broad economic perspective. In particular, it explores not only pension 
design but also various non-pension policies that directly impact the sustainability of 
pension systems. In doing so, it explores a rich menu of policy options. Indeed, a mix of 
policy measures involving both pension design and other policy areas is called for; no 
single magic solution is available that addresses all pension problems facing European 
countries and also carries sufficient political support. 
 
The stucture of the rest of this paper is as follows. After section 2 distinguishes three 
basic pension systems, section 3 explores the uncertainties facing old-age income 
insurance by presenting two scenarios for the future of pension systems. Section 4 
investigates various policy options involving European labor markets in general, and 
human capital accumulation in particular. Section 5 turns to pension design, dealing 
with each of the three pillars of a well designed pension system in turn. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Three pension systems  
 
For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish three types of pension schemes depending 
on the extent of intergenerational and intragenerational distribution: Pay-as-you-go 
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(PAYG), defined-benefit (DB), and defined-contribution (DC) schemes.2 PAYG 
systems pay retirement benefits out of contributions collected on the labor income of 
the young. In the absence of capital funding, these schemes typically imply substantial 
intergenerational transfers. Depending on the benefit and premium formula employed, 
they generally also redistribute resources within generations. These schemes are 
provided by the government, which can enforce the benefit promise and the associated 
redistribution through its tax powers.3 
 
In contrast to PAYG schemes, DC schemes are not redistributive - neither within nor 
across generations. Indeed, individual retirement benefits are directly related to 
individual contributions. At any point in time, accumulated capital corresponds to the 
discounted value of future retirement benefits. These schemes can be provided by the 
market as either personal or occupational pension schemes. 
 
DB schemes are a mixture of PAYG and DC schemes. These schemes are typically 
provided as occupational schemes by firms. Just like DC schemes, DB systems employ 
capital funding. However, in contrast to DC schemes, benefits are based on salary levels 
in the period preceding retirement rather than on the discounted value of individual 
lifetime contributions. In order to be able to pay these wage-linked benefits, DB 
schemes rely not only on the accumulation of financial assets but also on an implicit 
contract between the firm, its workers and retirees of different ages. If returns are low 
and wage increases substantial, then the firm and the younger workers transfer 
resources to older generations. If returns are high, in contrast, these parties benefit from 
lower contributions. Since these schemes benefit from intergenerational risk sharing, 
they can invest over a longer horizon and thus take on more risk. In this way, they are 
better able to exploit the equity premium than are DC schemes. 
 
                                                           
2 Bovenberg and Van der Linden (1997) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these 
three pension schemes in detail. In addition to the three pension schemes explored here, 
other types of pension systems can be distinguished. To illustrate, public, non-funded 
schemes, which involve some degree of intergenerational redistribution, may refrain 
from intragenerational redistribution by relying on so-called notional accounts. 
3 PAYG schemes can be seen as part of an implicit social contract between generations. 
The older generations raise the younger generations, thereby conferring human capital to 
the young. The elderly provide the young also with public capital goods, such as a clean 
environment, public infrastructure, and most importantly, knowledge and ideas. In return 
for this service, the younger generations later on transfer part of the return on these 
assets to the older generations as PAYG pension benefits. The market cannot enforce 
this implicit contract since it should be concluded before birth. 
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Firms can perform the redistributive activities associated with the benefit promise in DB 
schemes only in less-than-perfectly-competitive product and labor markets.4 Indeed, 
employers may employ DB schemes as an instrument to alleviate labor-market 
imperfections associated with asymmetric information and lack of commitment. In 
particular, long vesting periods and the link between retirement benefits and the final 
wage motivate workers not to shirk and serve to bind them to the firm. This reduces 
costs associated with monitoring, training, hiring, and firing. 
 
3. Two scenarios 
 
An important reason for adopting a mix of pension systems is to diversify risks; workers 
should not put all their eggs into one basket to avoid excessive exposure to the 
substantial political-, capital market-, and human capital risks.5 By increasing the 
vulnerability of pension systems to risks (see the introduction), aging makes 
diversification even more important. Each country should determine its own mix of 
pension systems depending on its political preferences (e.g. for inter- and 
intragenerational risksharing) and the functioning of capital and labor markets. The 
selected mix should depend also on expectations regarding future developments (e.g. 
regarding future returns on financial and human capital). 
 
This section presents two scenarios that illustrate the major uncertainties over a long 
time horizon. The scenarios show how the considerable uncertainty about various 
developments affects each of the three pension systems introduced in section 2. These 
scenarios reveal also which trends are relevant when a country considers the future of 
its own pension system. 
 
The two scenarios are called the market scenario and the intergenerational solidarity 
scenario, respectively.6 In the market scenario, markets are competitive and dynamic, 
capital and labor mobility are high, the population is heterogeneous, the income 
distribution within generations is less equal, and formal market relationships are 
dominant. In the intergenerational solidarity scenario, in contrast, implicit contracts, 
government intervention, and various non-market institutions play an important role in 
alleviating various imperfections in labor and capital markets. Indeed, markets are much  
                                                           
4 Also government regulations may help occupational schemes to perform risk sharing and 
prevent adverse selection by making collective labor agreements compulsory for 
particular sectors. 
5 In this connection, Merton (1983) argues that a mix of funded and unfunded pension 
systems is optimal. In the absence of tradable human capital, the unfunded component 
provides the elderly with a claim on human capital. 
6 The description of these scenarios draws heavily on Bovenberg and Van der Linden 
(1997). This latter study also provides a numerical illustration of these two scenarios, 
focusing on the uncertainty surrounding the elements of the Aaron condition (see Box 1). 
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Box 1  Aging and the Aaron condition 
 
The Aaron condition (see Aaron (1966)) reveals how the rate of return and the growth 
rates of labor productivity and the labor force affect the relative merits of PAYG versus 
funded schemes. The long-run return to PAYG schemes depends on the growth rate of 
labor income determining the growth of the contribution base. The return on funded 
schemes, in contrast, depends on the rate of return on financial assets. Hence, in the 
long run, funding can offer a higher return if the rate of return on financial capital 
exceeds the growth rate of labor income (i.e. the sum of the growth rate of labor 
productivity and the growth rate of employment). However, PAYG schemes are always 
more favorable to the first generation because they can offer pension benefits without 
having to build up assets. 
 
The Aaron condition can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition involving the relative 
returns on human and financial capital. PAYG schemes rely on the human capital of the 
younger generations. Therefore, PAYG schemes are particularly attractive compared to 
funded schemes if a high growth rate of wages implies a high return on human capital 
while financial markets offer only low returns. The table below compares the average 
growth rate of wages with the average real return on capital in recent times. In contrast 
to the real interest on government bonds, the return on shares substantially exceeded the 
growth rate of wages during this period. 
 
The aging of the population reduces the attractiveness of PAYG by decreasing the 
growth rate of employment. However, aging is also likely to make labor scarcer relative 
to physical capital. This may raise wage growth and depress the rate of return on 
capital. Accordingly, the overall effect of aging on the Aaron condition is ambiguous. 
 
Table:  Real wage growth contrasted with real returns on capital, selected OECD  
countries, 1971 – 1990 
 Real wage 
growth 
Real average 
annual return on equities
Real average annual return 
 on government bonds 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
1.1 
2.5 
4.0 
3.6 
3.0 
1.4 
1.8 
2.4 
0.1 
5.0 
9.4 
9.6 
9.3 
11.2 
8.6 
4.7 
10.8 
5.9 
1.1 
4.5 
1.3 
2.6 
0.0 
1.8 
-1.7 
1.6 
1.2 
 
Source: World Bank (1994). 
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less competitive. Whereas the free-market perspective is dominant in the market 
scenario, the coordination perspective is important in the intergenerational solidarity 
scenario.7 Moreover, in the market scenario the rate of return on financial capital is 
relatively high, while in the intergenerational solidarity scenario the return on human 
capital is relatively attractive. The relative return of financial versus human capital 
affects the Aaron condition (see Box 1) and is therefore an important determinant of 
how attractive PAYG schemes are compared to funded schemes. The rest of this section 
discusses in more detail the features of the two scenarios, which are summarized in Box 
2. 
 
3.1 The market scenario 
 
Globalization and international convergence 
Globalization is proceeding rapidly. Information technology allows capital to become 
much more mobile internationally, not only within but also between regional blocks. At 
the same time, outward-looking policies and good public governance enhance the 
investment climate in the developing countries. Also abundant labor resources and 
enhanced educational levels contribute to this improved climate. Growing inward direct 
investment allows developing countries to benefit from knowledge spillovers. Indeed, 
knowledge is easily transmitted between people and firms. Internationally mobile 
factors (i.e. capital and knowledge) rather than relatively immobile factors (such as 
human capital) are the main motors behind economic growth. Hence, developing 
countries feature high productivity growth as their productivity levels rapidly catch up 
with those in developed countries. Excellent investment opportunities in developing 
countries with relatively young populations result in high interest rates on world capital 
markets. 
 
Growth in EU lags 
Growth in EU countries lags growth in younger countries, including the developing 
countries. The older labor forces in EU countries have a hard time keeping up with 
rapid technological changes. Moreover, training and education of the young suffers as 
political tensions between generations weaken the informal intergenerational contract 
between the old and the young. Also the high interest rate favors investment in financial 
capital over that in human capital. Moreover, taxes and transfers become increasingly 
distortionary as the trade-off between equity and efficiency worsens (see the sub-section 
on public policy below). 
 
                                                           
7 See CPB (1992) for a discussion of these various perspectives. 
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  Box 2  The main features of two scenarios 
  
 Market Intergenerational 
  solidarity 
Growth performance of regions 
EU and rest OECD -  + 
non-OECD +  -  
Returns on investment in EU  
return on capital +  - 
return on human capital  -  +  
Motors of economic growth 
human capital 0  + 
public infrastructure 0  + 
private research and development +  0  
International integration 
capital mobility +  0 
labor mobility 0  + 
trade between major trade blocks +  - 
international knowledge spillovers +  0  
Macro-economic balances in EU 
current account balance +  0 
government balance -  + 
private saving-investment balance +  -  
Technology 
biased towards low-skilled labor +  0 
process innovation 0  + 
product innovation +  0 
innovative start-up firms +  0 
innovation in large, mature firms 0  + 
tacit knowledge 0  +  
Human-capital formation in EU 
public education -  + 
incen. to invest in firm-specific skills -  + 
incentives to invest in general skills +  + 
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The main features of two scenarios (continued) 
 
 
 Market Intergenerational 
  solidarity  
Income distribution 
relative wages of low-skilled workers - 0 
relative primary incomes of the elderly +  - 
cost of medical care for the elderly 0  +  
Convergence of incomes 
international + - 
intergenerational  +  - 
intragenerational  -  0 
 
Labor market  
labor-market imperfections -  + 
participation rate  -  + 
effective retirement age -  + 
labor mobility across firms  +  - 
 
Capital market 
capital-market imperfections -  + 
capital mobility across firms +  - 
international capital mobility +  - 
 
Industrial structure 
stakeholder view of the firm -  + 
firm-specific investments -  + 
turnover of firms +  - 
large firms dominant -  + 
 
dominant market structure monopolistic oligopoly 
 competition 
Cultural trends 
individualization   +  - 
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The main features of two scenarios (continued) 
 
 
As their trade deficits grow after 2025, EU countries specialize in non-tradable service 
sectors, while many high-tech industrial sectors producing tradable goods move to 
younger countries. The narrowing gap in living standards between the EU and 
developing countries mitigates migration flows. Indeed, the world exploits the diverging 
needs and endowments of older, OECD countries and younger, developing countries 
through capital and trade flows rather than labor flows. 
 
Intragenerational inequity and heterogeneity 
Intragenerational inequities widen in EU countries as technological change is biased 
against low-skilled labor. At the same time, abundant supply of labor in developing 
countries keeps wages of low-skilled labor at relatively low levels. Moreover, overall 
supply of low-skilled labor in EU countries remains sizable because education and 
training in the EU fail to upgrade the skills of the low skilled. Schooling of low-skilled 
workers suffers from budgetary problems and political tensions that result in cuts in the 
funds earmarked for public education. Employers invest in their high-skilled workers 
ather than in flexible, low-skilled workers. All these trends increase wage disparities. 
 
 Market Intergenerational 
  solidarity  
Politics 
international cooperation +  - 
intergenerational contract -  + 
faith in government -  + 
faith in market forces +  - 
size of government  -  + 
 
Social security 
spending level -  + 
tagging -  + 
less moral hazard -  + 
level of insurance -  + 
 
Income support in old age 
Poverty alleviation through  
PAYG scheme -  + 
Old-age insurance through 
PAYG scheme -  + 
Occupational schemes of the DB type -  + 
Personal DC schemes +  - 
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The weak labor-market position of the low-skilled reduces the overall participation rate. 
Many of these workers retire early, draw on social security, and participate in the black 
and informal economies. The productivity of high-skilled workers continues to grow as 
the educational level rises. At the same time, the elderly with high incomes benefit from 
high returns on their saving. Moreover, their medical expenses do not rise much, as low 
wages reduce the costs of medical services. Furthermore, the elderly generally remain in 
good health for most of their retired lives. 
 
Thus, while convergence between the developed and developing countries reduces 
international inequities and high interest rates alleviate intergenerational inequities, 
intragenerational inequities within the industrial countries grow. 
 
Market structures 
In addition to incomes, lifestyles and work patterns become more heterogeneous. 
Individualisation is a major trend. Product differentiation becomes more important as 
tastes of consumers grow more heterogeneous. Accordingly, monopolistic competition 
becomes a dominant market structure. Start-up firms play a major role in product 
innovation. Indeed, firms turn over rapidly. 
As far as human capital is concerned, general skills are more important than firm-
specific skills. Moreover, job mobility is high and the labor market is rather 
competitive. The same holds true for the capital market, as the shareholder view of the 
firm dominates the stakeholder view. Indeed, efficient financial markets rapidly 
reallocate capital from old declining firms to innovative start-up firms. 
 
Public policy 
Intergenerational solidarity through collective PAYG schemes comes under pressure. 
The old are becoming a heterogeneous group featuring both high and low incomes. 
Hence, age is no longer a good indicator for poverty. Indeed, EU countries feature both 
young workers with low (labor) incomes and retirees who collect high (capital) 
incomes. 
 
With age being an inadequate indicator for poverty, tax privileges for the elderly are 
withdrawn. PAYG pensions substantially lag the standard of living of the young and are 
eventually integrated with poverty alleviation in general. To avoid a serious poverty 
trap, the government is not able to guarantee a high minimum income level. Indeed, 
taxes and transfers become increasingly distortionary because of two reasons. First, 
conditioning transfers on income is rather distortionary because flexible working 
patterns make labor supply rather elastic. Second, heterogenous life styles imply that the 
government cannot use "tagging" as a means to identify needy groups, but has to rely 
instead on income as an indicator for poverty. Indeed, the government reduces income 
differentials and provides insurance against low incomes more through the tax system 
(i.e. a negative income tax) and means-tested benefits and less through social insurance 
benefits conditional on non-income information (e.g., age, marital status, 
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unemployment, disability). To prevent agents from exploiting means-tested benefits 
during retirement and to compensate for the withdrawal of tax privileges for pension 
saving, the government makes some private pension saving compulsory. This stimulates 
saving but reduces labor supply. 
 
The heterogeneous population in combination with the trend towards individualisation 
causes the informal intergenerational contract between the generations to weaken. 
Fiscal imbalances originating in high interest rates, distortionary taxes, the low 
participation rate and the relatively low growth rate reinforce this trend. Consequently, 
the young receive less public education while the old collect less public transfers. 
Also occupational DB schemes become less important. These schemes are less 
appropriate for a flexible workforce with diverse needs. Moreover, in a rather 
competitive environment, firms can not sustain intergenerational solidarity among 
workers and can no longer commit to age-related pay schemes. 
 
DC schemes become more popular. These individual schemes better fit the diverse 
needs of the heterogeneous and flexible labor force. Moreover, funded schemes benefit 
from risk sharing in efficient financial markets, high interest rates, and good investment 
opportunities in the younger, developing countries. Indeed, through their investments, 
the elderly in the EU become stakeholders in the economies of the developing countries. 
 
3.2 The intergenerational solidarity scenario 
 
Regionalisation and divergence 
In this scenario, internationalization occurs within trading blocks. International political 
tensions and imperfections in capital markets due to asymmetric information inhibit 
sizable capital and trade flows between the main trading blocks. Hence, international 
capital and goods markets cannot take full advantage of differential demographic phases 
in developed and developing countries by moving capital towards the young, 
developing countries. Moreover, small inward capital flows imply that developing 
countries do not benefit from large knowledge spillovers. Growth in these countries 
suffers also from inward-looking policies and inadequate education and public 
infrastructure. Human capital, which is not very mobile internationally, is the main 
motor of growth. Indeed, knowledge is not very mobile internationally but rather is 
embodied in immobile people and rather immobile firms. Accordingly, productivity 
levels in developing countries fail to catch up with those in developed countries. 
Limited investment opportunities in the rest of the world and scarce labor in the EU 
keep interest rates in EU countries at rather low levels. 
 
High EU growth 
Productivity growth in the EU is rather high. Almost all domestic saving is invested in 
the EU. Scarce labor stimulates technologies that enhance the productivity of both high-
skilled and low-skilled labor. Productivity levels benefit also from the older, 
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experienced labor force. Moreover, public education raises the educational level of the 
young further, as the implicit intergenerational contract remains strong. Rapid wage 
growth reflects the key role of human capital in the growth process. This wage growth, 
together with low interest rates, also stimulates investment in human capital, rather than 
that in financial capital. EU countries specialize in knowledge-intensive high-tech 
sectors. 
 
Various developments offset the trend toward lower labor supply in EU countries due to 
aging. High wages stimulate the labor-market participation rate of women and the 
elderly. Moreover, the large gap in living standards between the EU and developing 
countries encourages some selective and controlled inward migration into the EU. 
Indeed, labor flows rather than capital and goods flows exploit the diverging 
demographic developments in various parts of the world. 
 
Intragenerational inequities and heterogeneity 
Intragenerational inequities in the EU are contained. Wages of low-skilled workers are 
upheld by the scarcity for labor and the abundance of capital. Public education and on-
the-job training succeed in upgrading the skills of many low skilled, thereby increasing 
the wages of the remaining low-skilled workers. The stronger labor-market position of 
low-skilled workers protects their participation rate and raises their effective retirement 
age. 
 
The elderly remain a rather homogeneous group featuring relatively low incomes. The 
elderly generations suffer from low rates of return on their saving. Moreover, medical 
expenditures are high, as many elderly suffer from poor health. At the same time, high 
wage growth raises the price of (medical) services provided to the elderly. 
 
Thus, in contrast to the previous scenario, international and intergenerational inequities 
are maintained. Intragenerational inequities, however, do not widen. 
 
Market structures 
Lifestyles and work patterns do not become much more heterogeneous. 
Individualisation is a less dominant trend. Product differentiation is less important. 
Accordingly, R&D focuses more on process innovation than on product innovation. 
Most technological advances occur in large established firms that internalize knowledge 
spillovers rather than in start-up firms. Firms turn over slowly. Retained earnings are 
the main source of investment financing. Oligopolistic market structures become more 
dominant. 
 
Human capital is rather firm-specific. Labor and capital mobility between firms is less 
important, as adjustments occur within rather than across firms. Labor and capital 
markets are not very competitive, while corporatist institutions help to alleviate labor 
market imperfections. Informal contracts play an important role in encouraging firm-
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specific investments and binding workers to firms. The stakeholder view of the firm 
remains dominant in Europe. 
 
Public policy 
Intergenerational solidarity through collective PAYG schemes is maintained. Age 
remains a good indicator for poverty. More generally, the informal intergenerational 
contract between the generations remains intact. The high participation rates of old and 
young workers and the low interest rates create the budgetary room to provide both a 
good education to the young and sizable PAYG transfers to the old. Moreover, the 
elderly can enforce the intergenerational contract because their sheer number and their 
homogeneity makes them strong politically. Indeed, the informal intergenerational 
contract makes the elderly stakeholders in the high-yielding human capital of the young 
in their own countries. In the market scenario, in contrast, formal contracts cause the 
elderly to become stakeholders in developing countries. 
 
The economic cost associated with transferring incomes from the young to the elderly is 
rather low. First, the government can condition transfers on age rather than income. 
Second, marginal tax rates are not so distortionary because labor supply is rather 
inelastic. 
 
DC schemes suffer from low returns and high transaction costs. The tastes of the 
population remain rather homogeneous. Accordingly, collective DB schemes remain 
popular as an instrument for intergenerational risksharing. Moreover, employers use 
these pension schemes as a means to motivate workers and to tie them to the firm. 
 
4. Policies to protect retirement income  
 
The scenarios above illustrate that the future is fundamentally uncertain, especially over 
a long time horizon. To diversify risks, policymakers in EU countries should take action 
on several fronts. The use of several instruments is attractive, not only from the point of 
view of risk sharing, but also for political reasons: costs and benefits are spread over 
various groups. Moreover, by using both carrots and sticks, policymakers prevent 
specific groups from being alienated and ensure that various groups become 
stakeholders in the reform process. 
 
This section investigates various policy options involving European labor markets in 
general and human capital accumulation in particular. Indeed, whereas pension reform 
in the United States is aimed mainly at raising saving, malfunctioning labor markets are 
at the heart of the looming pension crisis in Europe. 
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4.1 Human capital of the elderly 
 
Unemployment and early retirement 
Over the last two decades, the effective retirement age has dropped substantially in 
European countries (see Table 1). Various policies encouraged older workers to leave 
the labor market in order to preserve employment opportunities for younger workers in 
the face of widespread unemployment.8 These policies, however, have set in motion a 
vicious circle. By narrowing the contribution base and raising the required financing for 
early retirement benefits, these policies require high premium and tax rates on younger 
workers, thereby further raising unemployment and depressing labor supply. Indeed, by 
harming the supply of experienced labor, early retirement is an increasingly 
shortsighted way to address unemployment. The associated distortions become more 
and more costly in an aging society. 
  
Table 1: Employment rate of older workers in OECD countriesa 
  
 
 
1980 
 
1985 
 
1990 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
Greece 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
53.8 
61.3 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
51.5 
 
.. 
.. 
47.1 
.. 
.. 
36.3 
63.9 
44.7 
65.7 
 
51.8 
60.5 
37.1 
37.2 
33.3 
47.0 
47.2 
 
26.0 
50.1 
45.4 
45.1 
40.0 
27.3 
65.5 
38.2 
65.0 
 
54.0 
62.9 
39.2 
35.6 
32.0 
49.2 
47.0 
 
21.4 
53.6 
42.6 
40.8 
40.0 
27.3 
65.5 
38.2 
65.0 
 
55.1 
63.7 
37.8 
33.5 
27.0 
47.6 
43.6 
 
23.3 
49.3 
34.4 
40.5 
39.2 
22.7 
63.1 
32.1 
61.9 
 
57.7 
63.8 
38.8 
33.0 
26.9 
48.3 
45.4 
 
22.5 
50.4 
36.2 
38.5 
41.6 
33.3 
66.9 
34.8 
63.0 
 
a. Employment of workers aged 55-65 as a percentage of the population aged 55-64.  
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1978-1998, part III.  
                                                           
8 Gruber and Wise (1999) document how various government policies have contributed to 
lower labor force participation of older workers. They compute effective tax rates on 
continuing to work and relate these tax rates to the effective retirement age.  
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Indexing retirement age to life expectancy 
Together with a drop in fertility, a higher life expectancy is the main force behind the 
aging of the population. Higher longevity implies that human capital lasts longer, so 
that investments in human capital become more attractive. Moreover, workers can 
benefit more from experience and from learning by doing. Indeed, it is somewhat 
paradoxical that a longer expected lifetime is seen as a threat, especially because people 
are able to learn up to high ages. The most natural way to insure society against a longer 
average lifespan of its citizens is the indexation of the official retirement age9 (and also 
the age at which individuals can take advantage of tax-privileged private pensions) to 
life expectancy. In this way, the risk of a longer life is shifted to those who can best bear 
it (i.e. those close to retirement) rather than those who cannot adjust easily to this risk 
(i.e. the retired, who would bear the risk if pension benefits were cut). 
 
Raising the effective retirement age is a powerful instrument to maintain solid financing 
for pension systems in an aging society. Pension systems reap a double dividend by 
keeping older workers employed longer: not only do they avoid having to pay out the 
most expensive pension year, but they also collect one more year of pension 
contributions. The elderly rely less on the solidarity of the young and more on their own 
human capital. By redistributing human capital more equally over various generations, a 
higher retirement age attacks at the root the potential fiscal and social problems due to 
aging. Indeed, the labor income of the elderly could become another major pillar of old-
age insurance (as the elderly enjoy greater longevity and better health). The automatic 
adjustment of the retirement age to life expectancy prevents ad-hoc political 
interventions. By thus reducing political risk, it allows workers to anticipate a longer 
working life by better maintaining their human capital through life-long learning. 
 
Life-long learning and higher retirement age 
Raising the effective retirement age requires a stronger labor-market position of elderly 
workers. Without such a stronger labor-market position, elderly workers would end up 
in expensive disability and unemployment schemes if the official retirement age were 
increased. Preventing this calls for a higher level of labor productivity and/or lower 
wage costs for elderly workers. Raising the productivity of elderly workers is difficult 
to achieve without eliminating the policies that encourage workers to retire early. The 
longer time horizon associated with a higher retirement age (together with higher 
longevity) encourages workers to maintain their human capital better through life-long 
training. Hence, raising the retirement age and facilitating life-long learning are 
complements. The faster obsolescence of knowledge in a modern dynamic economy 
requires life-long learning. Life-long learning will also become more attractive as the 
aging of the population renders human capital scarcer compared to physical capital, 
thereby raising the return of human capital compared to the return on financial capital. 
                                                           
9  The official retirement age is the age at which not only public pension benefits are paid 
out but also the work test for welfare benefits is no longer applied. 
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Wage flexibility of older workers calls for social insurance reform…. 
A higher employment rate of older workers requires that the wages of these workers 
become more flexible so that wages can be more in line with individual productivity. To 
achieve this, age-related pay schemes have to be reconsidered.10 For example, 
occupational pension systems that link pension benefits to final pay discourage gradual 
retirement through occupational downgrading with lower rates of pay. Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (1998) show how generous unemployment and disability benefits that are based 
on previous earnings inhibit the labor market from easily adjusting to adverse shocks. In 
particular, in the face of generous insurance benefits that exceed their labor 
productivity, skilled workers who face a substantial capital loss on their human capital 
(e.g. as a result of being laid off) are discouraged from searching for new jobs and from 
reducing their reservation wage in line with their productivity. In this way, social 
insurance sets in motion a vicious circle of high unemployment and skill loss. This 
explains the high incidence of long-term unemployment and disability among older 
European workers (see Table 2). As the work force ages, these moral hazard problems 
associated with social insurance benefits based on previous earnings become more 
serious. Indeed, generous social insurance benefits based on final pay discourage 
workers from maintaining their human capital, since workers can rely on generous 
social benefits when their human capital becomes obsolete.11 
 
One can distinguish two possible directions for social-insurance reform. The first 
direction focuses on reducing the level of social insurance, while the second aims at 
preserving the European legacy of social equity by reducing improper use of social 
insurance. The second option requires tightening the requirements for social benefits 
(e.g., stricter evaluations of disability, making unemployment benefits conditional on 
retraining or accepting less desirable jobs), tightening checks on improper use of social 
benefits, and enhancing the efficiency of the organizations administering benefits. In 
this way, active labor-market policies help the elderly to remain in employment and to 
upgrade their skills. Moreover, by gathering of more information about health status, 
the government reserves disability and sickness benefits for those individuals with 
serious health problems. 
 
 
                                                           
10 More wage flexibility, however, may worsen the hold-up problem associated with 
investments in firm-specific human capital. In fact, a rising wage schedule may be 
viewed as an implicit contract between workers and employers. This implicit contract 
not only facilitates investments in firm-specific human capital, but also provides 
incentives to workers to provide effort. Hence, in the face of more wage flexibility, firms 
must employ other instruments to address these moral hazard and hold-up problems. 
11 At the same time, social benefits based on final pay increase the incentive to invest in 
human capital early in life since higher wages associated with more human capital raise 
social insurance rights. 
  22 
  
Table 2: Unemployment rates and the incidence of long-term unemployment, 1998 
 
 Unemployment rate  
(percentage of labor force) 
Unemployment for 12 
months or more (as 
percentage of unemployed) 
 15 to 64 years 45 to 64 years 15 to 64 years 45 to 64 years 
 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
Unweighted averages: 
 
North Americaa 
European Union 
OECD Europe 
Total OECD 
 
4.5 
4.2 
9.3 
11.9 
12.2 
6.2 
8.4 
 
7.9 
5.5 
9.4 
5.1 
11.5 
11.9 
2.8 
4.3 
7.6 
3.2 
4.9 
18.8 
8.4 
 
 
 
5.3 
8.7 
7.8 
7.4 
 
2.7 
3.5 
11.2 
8.5 
5.1 
4.4 
6.4 
 
5.6 
5.8 
6.5 
4.6 
9.9 
5.4 
1.4 
3.3 
4.8 
1.5 
3.4 
11.1 
6.2 
 
 
 
3.5 
6.3 
5.5 
5.2 
 
7.8 
17.9 
39.6 
40.5 
66.1 
32.8 
9.8 
 
33.6 
43.6 
61.7 
27.1 
34.0 
51.6 
31.3 
43.5 
17.8 
12.2 
43.8 
62.4 
42.6 
 
 
 
6.1 
44.3 
40.0 
32.9 
 
12.1 
23.4 
45.9 
56.0 
62.6 
50.6 
16.8 
 
47.0 
72.0 
76.3 
45.9 
52.4 
48.7 
44.3 
62.0 
28.5 
25.0 
63.3 
46.9 
56.9 
 
 
 
10.2 
56.0 
50.9 
42.6 
 
North America comprises Canada, Mexico and the United States.  
Source: OECD Unemployment Duration and Labour Force Databases. 
 
Both strategies may be combined, in part to diversify risks. Moreover, the first strategy 
aids the second: Lower benefits help to prevent improper use of social security. 
Furthermore, given the income floor established by welfare payments, the second 
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strategy is more appropriate for unskilled workers lacking substantial earning abilities, 
while the first strategy can be applied more to higher skilled workers. 
 
….and deregulation of labor- and commodity markets 
The growth of self-employment and part-time work may help retirement to become a 
less abrupt process and may allow workers close to retirement to bear a larger part of 
the risks associated with pension systems. Self-employment, entrepreneurship, and part-
time work may be stimulated by deregulating not only the labor market but also markets 
for various non tradables. To illustrate, sectors providing services and care to the very 
old seem to offer considerable scope for employing older persons who want to retire on 
a part-time basis. When labor becomes increasingly scarce and the need for these non-
tradable services grows, older workers face more incentives to remain active on the 
labor market, provided that markets for labor, goods and services function efficiently. In 
this way, the labor income of the older workers can be a fourth pillar12 providing old-
age income. 
 
4.2 Human capital of the young 
 
Increasing labor-market participation more generally 
The employment rate (computed as employment divided by the number of persons aged 
between 18 and 65) in Europe is considerably below that in the United States and Japan. 
Boosting the European employment rate would strengthen the base for financing old-
age benefits. Stimulating labor supply of not only older but also younger workers calls 
for enhancing the labor supply of vulnerable groups with few marketable skills through 
a more empowering social insurance system (see also the sub-section above). 
 
Higher female participation rate.... 
Besides greater longevity, a lower fertility rate is the other main cause behind the aging 
of the population. This lower fertility rate is closely related to better schooling of 
women. By making participation in the formal labor market more attractive, the higher 
human capital of women has raised the opportunity cost of raising children. In fact, the 
higher labor-force participation of women can be seen as the other side of the coin of 
aging on account of lower fertility. 
 
Another way to strengthen the contribution base of the pension system is to further raise 
the labor supply of women. More flexible labor and commodity markets facilitating 
part-time work would help to enhance the labor-market participation of women. Making 
it easier for women to maintain their human capital will reduce the need for women to 
rely on public transfers when old - an added benefit from the point of view of reducing 
the claim of old-age pensions on the budget. Moreover, a stronger labor-market position 
of women has produced an increasing number of dual-income families, which allows 
                                                           
12 The other three pillars are discussed in section 5. 
  24 
partners to insure each other against temporary income losses. Indeed, as the traditional 
family with a single breadwinner becomes less important, the minimum wage and the 
benefit levels in the welfare system can be reduced. To contain the claims on spending, 
the welfare state relies not only on an efficient labor market, but also on the family as a 
risk-sharing device. 
 
….while protecting fertility and investments in human capital of children 
A potential danger of stimulating female labor supply is that it harms fertility and more 
generally discourages parents from investing in the human capital of their children. 
Whereas stimulating labor supply may thus in the short run alleviate the financial 
difficulties of pension systems, it may worsen them in the long run, as it harms the 
quality and quantity of human capital embodied in children. To prevent these latter 
adverse effects on the accumulation of human capital, the government should assist 
low-income families with children through specific child allowances. Due to their 
responsibilities for children, these families are least able to exploit intra-family risk 
sharing. In addition to child allowances, facilities that help parents to return to the labor 
market after they have cared for their young children help protect fertility and long-run 
human capital accumulation.13 Moreover, a well-functioning market for child-care 
facilities can help families to combine the responsibilities of rearing children with labor-
force participation. Indeed, the Scandinavian countries, which feature good facilities for 
reconciling family and working lives, exhibit not only higher female labor-force 
participation but also higher fertility than the European countries that lack such facilities 
(like Germany and Italy). 
 
Facilitating the accumulation of human capital is an important way to strengthen the 
contribution base for PAYG pension systems and to protect the return in funded pension 
systems. In this connection, Heckman (2000) stresses the importance of early learning 
                                                           
13 Facilities for raising children offset the distortionary effects of PAYG pension systems 
on fertility. By pooling the earnings capacity of children, PAYG systems provide fertility 
insurance but at the same time distort fertility. Indeed, the major distortion of the PAYG 
system is its negative impact on fertility (and hence human capital formation) rather than 
that on financial savings (which is stressed in the literature on PAYG). In this 
connection, Sinn (2000) provides a related equity argument for child allowances: 
Persons should expect to care twice during their lifetimes, once for the elderly and once 
for the young. Those who shirk on the second duty should compensate those who do 
carry out both of their two tasks. 
 A related argument for child allowances for low-income households is that low-income 
parents typically do not leave bequests and thus can not enforce an implicit contract with 
their non-altruistic children. This contract involves the parents first raising the children 
and the children subsequently caring for their aged parents. By providing PAYG 
pensions and child allowances, the government in fact helps to enforce this contract (see 
Razin and Sadka (1995)). 
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in families as a source of key non-cognitive skills. In his view, learning is most 
effective when it begins at a young age, since learning begets learning. Together with 
the positive external effects of human capital accumulation, this insight provides an 
additional argument in favor of targeting learning subsidies at the very young through 
child allowances.14 
 
5. Pension design 
 
Pension schemes serve various objectives: alleviating poverty, providing insurance 
against longevity and other risks in old age, and combatting adverse selection, myopia 
due to bounded rationality, and high information and transaction costs.15 Depending on 
the particular objective, one type of pension scheme may perform best. In particular, 
alleviating old-age poverty is best accomplished by a nationwide public PAYG system 
that provides a minimum standard of living in old age. The objective of relatively 
uniform insurance against longevity and income risks in old age may require 
compulsory insurance. This would help in avoiding moral hazard involving means-
tested benefits, preventing high transaction costs due to adverse selection in annuity 
markets, containing myopic behavior due to bounded rationality, and facilitating 
intergenerational risk sharing. Since this insurance function is not explicitly aimed at 
poverty alleviation, contributions can be closely linked to benefits, thereby mitigating 
disincentives. Those high-income workers who are better able to deal with the 
investment risks and want to go beyond the mandatory level of pension insurance can 
rely on supplementary private pension plans of the DC type. The separation of tasks in 
three pillars allows each of the pillars to focus on a clear goal, thereby avoiding non-
transparent and perverse redistribution (see World Bank (1994) and Holzmann (2000)). 
 
Before the next three sections turn to the proper design of each of the three pillars, the 
rest of this section investigates the requirements that apply to all pension systems. A 
common key requirement is transparency about objectives and risk sharing. Explicit 
agreements about how to share risks become even more important, as aging makes 
pension systems more vulnerable to shocks. Being explicit about the risk-sharing 
                                                           
14 Higher productivity growth, however, may actually worsen the financial problems of 
pension systems if pension benefits are indexed to wages. Accordingly, raising 
productivity growth makes PAYG and DB schemes more sustainable only if pensions 
are not fully indexed to wages. Indeed, since the elderly care both about their absolute 
and relative living standard, pensions may be indexed to a mix of prices and wages. 
15 CPB (1997) discusses the following market failures in pension insurance that give rise to 
these objectives: lack of intergenerational risk sharing, adverse selection, myopia, high 
transaction and information costs, lack of intragenerational solidarity, and moral hazard 
in exploiting means-tested benefits. 
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agreement by setting clear rules16 (and more transparent accounting) increases the costs 
associated with breaking the contract, thereby reducing political risks surrounding 
public PAYG and private DB schemes that are engaged in intergenerational risk 
sharing. To the extent that not all risks can be foreseen and pension contracts remain 
incomplete, the governance structure of pension systems is crucial. The interests of the 
stakeholders of the pension funds should be well represented in the decision-making 
bodies. In this way, collective pension systems can optimize the trade-off between 
commitment (to the implicit contract safeguarding the interests of the stakeholders) and 
flexibility (to respond to unforeseen shocks). 
Transparency about the exact nature of the pension contract (including the nature of 
administrative charges) is important not only for PAYG and DB schemes, but also for 
individual DC schemes. It combats agency costs by allowing better supervision and 
more transparent competition between the providers of these complex products. 
Moreover, it facilitates the role of the reputation mechanism in disciplining pension 
providers. The debacle of selling personal pensions in the United Kingdom in the 
beginning of the eighties revealed that a strong, transparent and simple regulatory 
framework is essential to achieve these objectives. 
 
5.1 The public PAYG system 
 
Focus PAYG on poverty alleviation  
Several large OECD countries, including Germany, France and Italy, have integrated 
two main functions of pensions (i.e. poverty alleviation and old-age insurance) into a 
single comprehensive public pension system. These countries should consider focusing 
the public scheme on poverty alleviation by gradually reducing PAYG benefits for 
those earning higher incomes.17 This yields a better balanced portfolio between funded 
and PAYG schemes, as workers with middle- and higher incomes would substitute 
private, funded pensions for public PAYG benefits. In this way, they would better 
diversify political and market risks. Table 3 provides information about the current mix 
of funded and unfunded pension obligations in OECD countries. 
 
                                                           
16 Such rules may involve for example indexing the retirement age to life expectancy and 
linking pension benefits to the elderly and the acquired pension rights of workers to 
wages after pension contributions have been deducted (so that the risk-sharing base is 
broadened).  
17 A flat public pension may be preferred over means-tested public pensions because 
means-tested benefits may be stigmatizing. These latter benefits may also discourage 
saving. Finally, they may undercut political support of the middle class for public 
pensions: targeted programs for the poor may result in poor benefits. 
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Table 3: Funded and unfunded pension rights in the European Union, 1999 
 (as a percentage of GNP) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 
 
Funded 
rights 
 
Unfunded 
rights 
 
Public debt 
 
Corrected 
public debta 
 
Fundingb 
 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
 
10 
89 
6 
12 
43 
19 
141 
10 
4 
86 
 
75 
87 
83 
138 
55 
157 
103 
93 
93 
68 
 
117 
58 
59 
61 
52 
119 
68 
58 
66 
49 
 
192 
145 
142 
199 
107 
276 
171 
151 
159 
117 
 
12 
51 
7 
8 
44 
11 
58 
10 
4 
56 
 
a. This column is computed as the sum of columns (2) and (3). 
b. This column is computed as column (1)/(column (1) + column (2)). 
 
The public scheme dealing with poverty alleviation is explicitly redistributive and 
should be financed from general tax revenues. Relying on broad-based taxes paid by the 
entire population rather than on payroll taxes shifts the tax burden away from workers 
to those outside the labor force, including the retired. Including retirement benefits in 
the base of the progressive income tax allows the tax system to continue to play an 
effective role in intra- and intergenerational risk sharing. In this way, the tax system can 
pool risks and shift these risks to those who can bear them best (see Box 3).  
 
A more heterogeneous older population calls for intragenerational transfers 
Reducing PAYG benefits for, and increasing the tax payments by, the more affluent 
elderly is consistent with the trend towards a more heterogeneous older population. 
When PAYG schemes were established, the second world war had impoverished the 
older generation. Since poverty was thus concentrated among the elderly, poverty 
alleviation called for transfers from the younger to the elder generation. At present, in 
contrast, age is generally no longer a good indicator of poverty, as many elderly have 
accumulated substantial financial wealth and more risks have shifted to the beginning of 
the life cycle. Hence, information on age should increasingly be supplemented by other 
information (in particular on incomes and family status) to identify those most in need 
of income support. In an aging society with a heterogenous population, alleviation of 
old-age poverty requires transferring resources from rich to poor pensioners (i.e. intra- 
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generational redistribution) instead of only transferring resources from the small young 
generation to the elderly (i.e. intergenerational distribution). Since many elderly lead 
longer, healthier lives then preceding generations, they are in a position to be net 
contributors to the budget for a longer time. 
 
Intragenerational redistribution implies that the link between individual contributions 
and benefits becomes less tight. Accordingly, pension contributions are perceived as a 
tax rather than a price paid for a future pension benefit. The associated distortions in 
labor supply are the inescapable implication of a worsening trade-off between 
Box 3  The tax treatment of pensions  
 
Most OECD countries treat pensions on a cash-flow basis under the personal income tax 
(see Dilnot and Johnson (1993)). Hence, pension contributions (i.e. saving) are tax 
deductible, while pension benefits (i.e. dissaving) are subject to the income tax. Capital 
income (i.e. interest, dividends, capital gains) in funded schemes is not taxed when it 
accrues. This tax treatment implies that the government delays the collection of the 
income tax until retirement. In this way, the government, in effect, participates in the 
pension funds. The return on this public investment amounts to the taxes the 
government eventually collects on the retirement benefits. If the tax rate against which 
contributions are deducted coincides with the rate at which benefits are ultimately taxed, 
the return on this implicit equity share of the government corresponds to the return 
pension funds collect on their investments. 
 
The cash-flow treatment yields a number of important advantages. In particular, the 
cash-flow treatment broadens the tax base when aging boosts public spending. If the 
government would abolish the cash-flow treatment of pensions by taxing pension 
contributions, it could alleviate future fiscal imbalances by cutting public debt now. 
However, such a reduction of public debt would require a lot of fiscal discipline. 
 
In a “grey” society with mature pension funds, the broader tax base under the cash-flow 
tax implies that unexpected shocks in public spending require smaller adjustments in tax 
rates, as income taxes are levied not only on workers but also on the retired. When 
higher age-related public spending requires higher public revenues, the cash-flow 
treatment mitigates the associated rise in tax rates on workers and thus alleviates the 
adverse effects of the higher tax burden on labor-supply incentives. The cash-flow 
treatment of pension benefits thus supports the role of the tax system as a device to pool 
risks across generations. By including retirement benefits in the income tax base, tax 
deferral provides the government with an additional instrument to ensure an equitable 
distribution between generations without adversely affecting the distribution within 
generations. Employing indirect (consumption) taxes (such as the value-added tax or 
excises) rather than the income tax to pool risks would put a relatively heavy burden on 
those elderly with low incomes. 
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efficiency and equity that is due to increased heterogeneity of the population. Indeed, 
more heterogeneity makes poverty alleviation more expensive. By clearly separating the 
two main roles of a pension system (i.e. poverty alleviation and pension insurance), 
however, the government may be able to eliminate non-transparent, undesirable 
redistribution, thereby improving the trade-off between efficiency, redistribution and 
risk sharing.18 Indeed, by more closely linking pension contributions and benefits in the 
insurance part of the pension system, the government may well be able to reduce the 
overall marginal tax rate. As workers become more flexible in selecting how and when 
to retire and, more generally, in deciding whether to supply labor to either the formal or 
the informal sectors, lowering the marginal tax wedge becomes all the more important. 
 
The transition and the credibility of public promises 
The presently retired generation has not been able to anticipate lower public PAYG 
benefits. Moreover, this generation cannot adjust easily because it has already 
depreciated its human capital. The short horizon of the elderly implies that they are risk 
averse and that they value stable rules. Accordingly, a strong case can be made for 
changing the rules of the game (i.e. reducing PAYG benefits and increasing taxes on the 
elderly) only gradually.19 Accordingly, PAYG systems aimed at poverty alleviation 
involve not only intragenerational redistribution but also extensive intergenerational 
redistribution. Extensive grandfathering provisions protecting those who are currently 
old are expensive, however, and would eliminate benefits in terms of enhanced fiscal 
sustainability and higher national saving. Indeed, grandfathering implies that younger 
generations have to pay not only for their own private benefits but also for the public 
benefits of the currently old. Hence, the government faces a trade-off between 
flexibility and stability.20 To enhance confidence and trust in a stable social contract 
                                                           
18 More generally, by using information efficiently, redistributive transfers can be targeted 
at those in need while eliminating perverse redistribution. An example of this is relying 
on information of life-time incomes, which allows the government to eliminate 
redistribution to agents enjoying high life-time incomes. Redistribution through 
compulsory individual saving schemes discussed in sub-section 5.3 achieve exactly that. 
19 Relative PAYG benefits can be reduced gradually by indexing benefits to prices rather 
than wages. 
20 This trade-off applies more generally to all policy reforms, including the various policy 
options discussed in this paper. Indeed, policy reforms tend to be politically feasible only 
if extensive grandfathering provisions are included and reforms are introduced gradually 
and with advance notice. The option value of the status quo is another reason to address 
the aging of the population by employing various policy instruments rather than relying 
on a single policy instrument. 
The trade-off between flexibility and stability can be phrased also as a trade-off between 
efficiency and equity. Policies that enhance aggregate welfare tend to come at the cost of 
older generations (who bear an unanticipated capital levy or suffer from broken public 
promises) or the poor. Hence, Pareto-improving reforms are difficult to come by. 
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while at the same time facilitating timely adjustments, governments should announce 
early any prospective changes in the social contract. This allows the large baby-boom 
generations to anticipate reduced public transfers in retirement. 
 
The literature has discussed extensively whether shifting from PAYG schemes to 
funded schemes can be Pareto improving. The major lesson of this literature is that a 
Pareto improvement, which protects also presently retired generations, is feasible only 
if such a pension reform succeeds in reducing a distortion somewhere in the economy. 
Examples of these distortions are the corporate income tax, inefficient redistribution, 
labor-market distortions due to incentives to retire early, inability of the political 
process to commit to promises (and the associated political risks), missing insurance 
markets (e.g. due to aggregate risks or the inability of agents to commit to insurance 
contracts before they are born), capital-market imperfections due to transaction costs or 
hold-up problems (which may give rise to the equity premium), distorted fertility 
decisions, and knowledge externalities. If the gains from reducing these distortions are 
sufficiently large, the government may employ public debt policy in such a way that all 
generations benefit from the efficiency gains. In particular, by financing part of the 
reform by issuing public debt, future generations, who tend to reap most the efficiency 
gains, pay part of the costs of the reform.21 
 
5.2 Compulsory pension insurance 
 
Privatize the second pillar 
Privatizing the insurance function of pensions yields a number of benefits. It 
strengthens the commitment to the pension insurance contract by reducing the 
temptation of politicians to tamper with the contract (see Bovenberg (2000a)). Funding 
a larger part of the pension system through private schemes strengthens the commitment 
of the political system to secure property rights more generally; since a larger part of the 
population acquires a stake in the return on capital, the political system is less tempted 
to expropriate these returns, thereby protecting entrepreneurs and investors against 
political risks (and the hold-up problem). Funding may generate positive externalities 
also on financial markets through greater capital market deepening and by allowing a 
larger part of the population to take advantage of the equity premium. Finally, funding 
is likely to encourage fiscal discipline, thereby stimulating saving and promoting fiscal 
sustainability in an aging society. 
 
 
 
                                                           
21 On the one hand, the provisions of the Stability and Growth pact may prevent EMU 
countries from pursuing this strategy. On the other hand, this strategy of replacing 
implicit by explicit public debt may prevent governments from having to buy up their 
stock of debt, which may facilitate the functioning of financial markets.  
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Risk sharing in DB schemes under siege 
In contrast to the first, public pillar aimed at poverty alleviation, the second should 
involve a strong actuarial link between contributions and benefits. In an aging society, 
DB schemes are likely to look more and more like DC schemes. The main reason is that 
the relatively small contribution base (compared to the outstanding obligations) makes 
it more difficult to shield the retired generations from adverse shocks through 
intergenerational risk sharing. Also the increased mobility of labor within and between 
industries threatens intergenerational risk sharing, as young workers can escape the 
implicit taxes associated with this risk sharing by moving to young firms that do not 
carry large pension obligations to retired workers. In order to protect intergenerational 
risk sharing in DB plans, risks should be shared broadly and explicitly over the young 
and the old (e.g. through a flexible retirement age, conditional indexation of pension 
rights, and rapid adjustments of contributions), pensions must be overfunded, and 
pension governance should be efficient (see Bovenberg (2000b)). 
 
Government continues to play key role 
The government could reduce the need for intergenerational risk sharing through 
collective DB funds by conducting more of this risk sharing through the tax system (see 
Box 4). Alternatively, it could issue new financial instruments, such as (wage) indexed 
bonds and so-called “survivors bonds,” which allow private insurers to hedge against 
aggregate mortality risks. In these ways and by proper regulation, the government can 
facilitate financial innovation in the annuity market. Indeed, various imperfections in 
this market due to adverse selection and uninsurable aggregate risks pose a serious 
obstacle towards more individual pension provisions22 (see Blake (2000)). 
 
5.3 Individual, voluntary pension insurance 
 
More heterogeneity: larger third pillar 
In setting the mandatory level of pension insurance above the minimum level provided 
by the public PAYG system, the government needs to trade off, on the one hand, 
providing enough risk sharing and combating adverse selection and, on the other hand, 
tuning pensions to individual needs. Setting the mandatory level too low harms inter- 
and intragenerational risk sharing and might induce workers to exploit means-tested 
benefits. Setting the level too high, in contrast, forces some households to save more 
than they would like. The associated implicit tax distorts saving and harms employment. 
                                                           
22 To illustrate, whereas deferred and flexible annuities allow individuals to diversify 
interest rate and asset price risks, they expose these individuals to mortality risks and 
may result in adverse selection. 
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Increased heterogeneity in preferences and life-cycle patterns calls for a reduction in the 
mandatory, collective part of old-age insurance for the middle- and higher incomes. The 
earners of these incomes are typically better able to deal with old-age risks. The third, 
Box 4  Intergenerational risk sharing through the tax system  
 
The government can reduce the need for intergenerational risk sharing through
collective pension funds by performing more of this risk sharing through the tax system.
By participating in the pension funds through the cash-flow tax treatment of pensions
(see Box 3), the government shares in the investment risk. The government can alleviate
the investment risk further by levying a tax rate on the investment income of pension
funds that rises with the average return on all pension saving. If the average return is
low, the government can transfer resources to the pension funds. Since the tax rate
depends on the average return of all pension funds rather than on the individual return
of each pension fund, this tax treatment does not affect the incentive of each individual
pension fund to invest in high-yielding assets. 
 
This tax treatment yields a number of advantages. The government, in fact, insures the
pension funds against long-run macro-economic investment and inflation risks that
these funds cannot hedge on financial markets. Consequently, the risk premium in
pension contributions can fall, thereby lowering wage costs and improving international
competitiveness. Moreover, DC schemes become more attractive. By reducing the
marginal tax wedge on labor, DC schemes improve the functioning of the labor market.
Furthermore, since pension funds no longer need to transfer resources across
generations, workers and firms can be left free to select their own pension plans. This
allows more competition among pension funds, which may reduce the overall costs of
pension provisions. Moreover, it allows pension provisions to better fit the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous population. Whereas all pension funds would be required to
participate in this risk sharing arrangement, firms and workers would be free to select
their own pension funds. 
 
As an alternative to this tax system, which may suffer from substantial political risk, the
government may bear only part of the macro-economic risk -- for example, by issuing
indexed bonds. In this way, pension funds are protected against inflation risk but still
bear real interest-rate risk. By issuing longer maturities, however, the government can
absorb part of this risk as well. The disadvantage of indexed government bonds
compared to risk sharing through the tax system is that pension saving would not flow
directly into the corporate sector. Hence, pension funds would contribute less to
enhancing corporate governance. As an alternative, the government may issue various
options (see Blake (2000)).  
  33 
voluntary, pillar of pension insurance is thus likely to become more important. One way 
to increase the flexibility and personal responsibility in pension insurance would be to 
reduce compulsory levels of collective insurance and provide more tax privileges to 
registered individual accounts that would be taxed on a cash-flow basis (see Box 3).23 
Insure human-capital risk…. 
These individual accounts would insure individuals against not only old-age risks but 
also other human-capital risks such as unemployment and obsolescence of human 
capital. Indeed, these accounts could be viewed as an insurance device against human 
capital risk. Individuals would thus be allowed to withdraw some funds from this 
account before their retirement age, for example to invest in their own human capital24 
or that of their children (by taking time out to care for them). In this way, savings are 
used to protect and maintain human capital rather than to write off this capital. 
 
….encourage investments in children…. 
By allowing people to care for their children, individual saving schemes would 
strengthen the implicit intergenerational contract, protect fertility, and encourage high-
yielding investments in human capital. Moreover, individuals could save for old-age 
risks in the form of not only financial capital but also human capital. Indeed, by 
investing in and maintaining their human capital (e.g. in the form of a second career 
after one has cared for young children), individuals would be able to work longer and 
partners could share risks better. For example, individuals could draw on the account 
when being unemployed or when having cared for their young children in order to 
invest in training to strengthen their position on the labor market. 
 
….stimulate a longer active working life…. 
The individual accounts would facilitate flexible retirement at an actuarially fair price, 
thereby contributing to a strong fourth pillar (i.e. labor income) for providing income in 
older age, extending the life time of human capital, and alleviating moral hazard in 
maintaining human capital. Doing justice to the heterogeneity of elderly workers is 
particularly important, as people tend to become more heterogeneous in their tastes and 
abilities as they grow older. More generally, the registered accounts would meet new 
needs due to a less rigid allocation of learning, working, and retiring over the life cycle. 
                                                           
23 Some payments into these individual accounts could be made mandatory, especially if 
these accounts are meant to substitute not only for collective pension insurance but also 
other social insurances (see below).  
24 Rather than financing institutions providing educational services, the government could 
put an initial starting balance in the account of young adults, which they could draw on 
to buy educational services during their lifetime. The government could also allow 
agents to accumulate negative balances in their accounts and forcing agents to pay off 
these negative balances through the tax system. This is the so-called equity participation 
model, which Australia applies to allow students without sufficient liquid funds to 
participate in higher education.  
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This latter development is strengthened by the improved education of women who 
participate more fully on the formal labor market and the more rapid depreciation of 
knowledge in a modern economy; the modern working life tends to be interrupted by 
retraining and caring for others in the home. More flexibility in the use of pension rights 
allows resources to be moved from later in life (old-age poverty has been cut 
substantially) to earlier in life (risks early in life have increased, as indicated by child 
poverty and stress among young families). 
 
….alleviate moral hazard in social insurance and encourage wage flexibility…. 
The drawing rights in the registered account could help to reduce the need for not only 
collective pension insurance but also other collective social insurances. The accounts 
would thus alleviate moral hazard in social insurance and enhance work incentives more 
generally, especially for the middle- and higher incomes. Indeed, as labor markets 
become more flexible and life cycles more heterogeneous with voluntary spells of non-
work, distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary inactivity becomes more 
difficult, thereby increasing the risk of moral hazard. The individual accounts could 
break the vicious circle of high unemployment and skill loss set in motion by social 
insurance benefits based on previous earnings (see Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)). By 
reducing the reservation wage of older workers, these accounts would combat the high 
incidence of long-term unemployment and disability among older European workers. 
 
….while protecting vulnerable groups 
In order to protect vulnerable groups, the government could top-up the contributions of 
poor people or compensate those with little human capital (for example, because of a 
handicap) in the form of a higher initial balance in the individual accounts. In this way, 
the accounts would shift more responsibility to the individual without relinquishing 
redistributive goals. If experiments show these registered accounts to be successful, 
governments could move a larger part of the insurance policies provided by the welfare 
state in this direction.25 When a person has exhausted the account due to long-term 
unemployment, he or she would be allowed to accumulate some negative balances 
(which would be remitted at retirement or death). Eventually, such an individual could 
resort to social assistance. 
 
In order to combat moral hazard, the government would have to require working 
individuals to put some money in the accounts while regulating withdrawals from the 
account when individuals do not participate on the labor market. Moreover, social 
assistance would provide conditional transfers that would balance the carrot of the 
benefit with the stick of particular obligations. Government transfers associated with 
public insurance would thus be better targeted at vulnerable groups. Whereas 
redistribution would involve some costs in preventing moral hazard and affecting the 
                                                           
25 For similar proposals to reform the welfare state, see Orszag and Snower (1997), 
Feldstein and Altman (1998), and Fölster (1999). 
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privacy of individuals, the overall costs of redistribution would fall. Hence, the trade-off 
between equity and efficiency would improve. Indeed, the same amount of 
redistribution could be achieved at much lower marginal tax rates for the middle- and 
high income earners.26 Eliminating undesirable redistribution to agents with high life-
time incomes thus provides scope for Pareto-improving reforms. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Aging makes pension insurance more expensive by making pension systems more 
vulnerable to risks. In order to diversify these risks, countries are well advised to act on 
several fronts, some of which go beyond the pension system. At the same time, pension 
policies are affected not only by demographic trends (such as aging), but also by other 
trends (such as technological change, financial innovation, more heterogeneity in 
preferences and life-cycle patterns of work, and increasing labor mobility and female 
labor-force participation). Enhancing the sustainability of pension insurance in an aging 
society requires investing in human capital (especially that of children) and boosting 
labor force participation (especially that of the elderly). In the latter way, the labor 
income of the elderly can become the fourth pillar of a diversified mix of pension 
insurances. A higher labor-force participation of the elderly requires reforming social 
insurance with more emphasis on private saving schemes. 
 
Countries that presently rely heavily on public PAYG schemes can diversify risks by 
stimulating private pension provisions through gradually reducing PAYG benefits 
offered to middle- and higher income individuals. The PAYG scheme would thus be 
targeted at alleviating old-age poverty. Governments can stimulate private pensions by 
issuing new financial instruments, conducting intergenerational risk sharing through the 
tax system, and increasing the transparency of the market through regulation and 
supervision. More generally, public insurance schemes should be more explicit about 
how they share demographic and other risks. In this way, the government continues to 
play a role in facilitating risk sharing. The search continues for efficient mixes of 
private and public arrangements in providing pension insurance. 
                                                           
26 See Fölster (1999). Reducing marginal tax rates for those agents earning low life-time 
incomes is much more difficult. These agents continue to face a poverty trap as their 
additional incomes are used in part to reduce their debts or to replace social assistance 
benefits.  
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